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MODERNIZING THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT STANDARDS IN THE ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY
Sydney Thurman-Baldwin*
As oil and gas continue to be hot commodities for national
economies, the number of international arbitrations in the energy
sector has continued to rise in recent years. As the utilization of
International Arbitration continues to rise in Energy disputes, so
does the invocation of The Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”). The
ECT promotes inter-governmental cooperation with contracting
parties in the energy sector through its provisions on investment
protection, provisions on trade, transit of energy, energy
efficiency,
environmental
protection
and
dispute
resolution. These provisions are considered to be the cornerstone
of the treaty, fostering a ‘level playing field’ for foreign
investments in the energy sector and minimizing the noncommercial risks associated with such investments, all pursuant
to the Minimum Standards for Investment Protection described in
Section 10(1) of the ETC, such as Fair and Equitable Treatment
(FET). However, such standards are overbroad and leave room
for numerous interpretations. Though likely intended to
strengthen the application of FET, overbreadth dampens the effect
of the ETC’s FET provision, as it fails to uniformly instruct both
parties and tribunals on the parameters of FET under the Treaty
and could ultimately hinder the FET provided to foreign investors.
This paper seeks to address ways in which Article 10(1) of the
ECT, on Fair and Equitable Treatment, can be modified to better
protect foreign investments. The first part of this paper will
discuss a brief history of this ETC. The second part of this paper
will discuss Article 10(1) of the ETC as it pertains to FET and its
applicability in practice, by focusing on three recent Spanish
cases: (1) Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. The
*
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Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1; (2) Charanne B.V.,
Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v Spain, SCC Arbitration No.:
062/2012; and (3) Eisner Infrastructure Limited and Energia
Solar Luxembourg S.a.r.l. v Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/13/36. The paper concludes by offering suggestions for
modernizing Article 10(1), using the recent Spanish cases as a
model.
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As oil and gas continue to be hot commodities for national
economies, the number of international arbitrations in the energy sector
has continued to rise in recent years. By the end of 2019, ICSID reported
that 42% of cases administered by ICSID arose from the energy sector,
which was more than any other sector.1 As the utilization of International
Arbitration continues to rise in Energy disputes, so does the invocation of
The Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”)2. The ECT was established to
provide a multilateral framework for energy cooperation. Pursuant to
Article 2 of the Energy Charter Treaty, its purpose is to ‘promote longterm co-operation in the energy field, based on complementarities and
mutual benefits, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the
1

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 2019. 2019 ICSID Annual
Report : Excellence in Investment Dispute Resolution. Washington, DC: ICSID. © ICSID.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32591 License: CC BY-NC-ND 3.0
IGO. (In the 2019 Fiscal Year, the extractives and energy sectors (collectively “the Energy
Sector”) accounted for the largest share of cases, in which 21% involved the oil, gas and
mining industry, and 21% involved electric power and other energy sources).
2
See, e.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 2016. The ICSID
Caseload Statistics: Special Focus, European Union.
Washington, DC:
ICSID. https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%2
0EU%20(English)%20Updated%20June%2013%202016%20Final.pdf.
(“ Of the 93
ICSID cases involving an EU member State, 42% were based on the State’s consent to
arbitrate in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)”).
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Treaty.3 The ECT promotes inter-governmental cooperation with
contracting parties in the energy sector through its provisions on
investment protection, provisions on trade, transit of energy, energy
efficiency, environmental protection and dispute resolution4. These
provisions are considered to be the cornerstone of the treaty, fostering a
‘level playing field’ for foreign investments in the energy sector and
minimizing the non-commercial risks associated with such investments,5
all pursuant to the Minimum Standards for Investment Protection
described in Section 10(1) of the ETC, such as Fair and Equitable
Treatment (FET). However, such standards are overbroad and leave room
for numerous interpretations. Though likely intended to strengthen the
application of FET, overbreadth dampens the effect of the ETC’s FET
provision, as it fails to uniformly instruct both parties and tribunals on the
parameters of FET under the Treaty and could ultimately hinder the FET
provided to foreign investors.
Modernization of the Energy Charter Treaty’s Article 10(1) on
Fair and Equitable Treatment would strengthen protection of foreign
investments under the Treaty. The first part of this paper will discuss a
brief history of this ETC. The second part of this paper will discuss Article
10(1) of the ETC as it pertains to FET and its applicability in practice, by
focusing on three recent Spanish cases: (1) Masdar Solar & Wind
Cooperatief U.A. v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1;
(2) Charanne B.V., Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v Spain, SCC
Arbitration No.: 062/2012; and (3) Eisner Infrastructure Limited and
Energia Solar Luxembourg S.a.r.l. v Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36.
Third, I will conclude the paper by offering suggestions for modernizing
Article 10(1), using the recent Spanish cases as a model.

I. INTRODUCTION
The first international arbitration invoking the ECT, AES v. Hungary
I, was registered on 25 April 2001, three years after the ECT entered into
force.6 The first award followed in December 2003, in Nykomb v. Latvia.7
By 2013, the number of new arbitrations quadrupled from four initiated in

3

Energy Charter Treaty art. 2, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 373 [hereinafter ECT]
See generally ECT.
5
Kaj Hobér, Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, Journal of
International Dispute Settlement, Feb. 3, 2010, at 153, 155.
6
See AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary (Gr. Brit. v. Hung.), ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/04, Settlement (Jan. 3, 2002).
7
Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. Latvia, SCC Case No. 118/2001, Award (Dec.
16, 2003).
4
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2012 to 16, reaching a peak in 2015 with 25 cases.8 While this figure fell
in 2016, the ECT has remained the most frequently invoked investment
agreement in international arbitration cases.9 Today, 87 countries and
international organizations have signed the ECT, making it the most
frequently invoked international investment treaty. It is the only
multinational treaty specifically dealing with investment issues in the
energy industry.10
The widespread usage of the ETC highlights the urgency to ensure that
the treaty is in fact meeting its intended goals. In January 2017, several
experts from the industry, governments, legal circles and academics (in
addition to officials from UNCITRAL and UNCTAD) discussed the
investment protection standards under the ECT, concluding that some
particular issues could benefit from additional clarification.11 One such
aspect frequently noted as ripe for modernization and subsequent
clarification was the provision on Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET)
cited in Article 10(1) of the ETC.12
Fair and equitable treatment is the most frequently invoked protection
in claims under the investment treaties.13 The FET standard varies from
case to case and “depends on the interpretation of specific facts for its
content”14 and the full set of circumstances. At its core, FET protects the
Parties’ legitimate expectations.15 It also provides protection against

8

Global Arb. Rev., The Guide to Energy Arbitrations n.9 (J. William Rowley et al. eds.,
2nd ed. 2017) (“As reported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), and summarized by the Energy Charter Secretariat: International Energy
Charter, Investment dispute settlement, latest statistics (updated as of 1 January 2017),
available at http://www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/dispute-settlement/cases-up-to-1january2017/.”).
9
Id.
10
CRINA BALTAG, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: THE NOTION OF INVESTOR (Wolters
Kluwer 2012).
11
Energy Charter Secretariat. "Decision of the Energy Charter Conference: Modernization
of the Energy Charter Treaty." energycharter.org, Energy Charter Secretariat, 28 Nov.
2017,
www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CCDECS/2017/CCDEC201723.pdf.
12
Id.
13
De Brabandere, E. (2017). Fair and Equitable Treatment and (Full) Protection and
Security in African Investment Treaties Between Generality and Contextual Specificity.
The Journal of World Investment & Trade, 530–555. https://doi.org/10.1163/2211900012340050.
14
Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania (Gr. Brit. v. Tanz.), ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶
593 (July 24, 2008) (quoting PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THE LAW 625 (Oxford University Press, 1995)).
15
United Nations Treaty on Trade and Development. "Fair and Equitable Treatment:
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II." unctad.org, United
Nations, 2012, unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf. 90.
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procedural impropriety, denial of justice and discrimination.16 States’
measures and actions are assessed objectively.17 Subjective unilateral
expectations of individual investors and findings of bad faith are both
irrelevant to tribunal determination.18 Generally, the application of FET
in International Law is fact-specific and requires an in-depth factual
analysis to assess applicable standards of the contracting parties.19 Though
most BITs provide for FET, some leave the standard wholly undefined20,
while others relate FET to the minimum standards of treatment under
customary international law.21 A strong FET provision prevents
inconsistent administrative acts.22 The overbroad nature of the Energy
Charter Treaty’s FET provision is problematic because the exact scope and
meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment as it applies to the Treaty are
absent. Such void leaves room for diminished application and subsequent
violation.

II. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT UNDER THE ECT
The use of the term “fair and equitable treatment” is not one-size-fits
all. Instead, the legal result is largely dependent on the facts of each case
as they apply to the governing treaty.23 As such, there is extensive debate
16

Id.
American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. (AMT) (US) v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID case
No. ARB/93/1 Award, 21 February, 1997, reprinted in 36 International Legal Materials
1531 (1997).
18
Id.
19
Cf. T. Wälde, Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of
Key Issues, Transnational Dispute Management 1 (2004), http://www.transnationaldispute-management.com/samples/freearticles/tv1-2-article224bhtm.
20
See, e.g., United States-Argentina BIT, Arg.-U.S., art. 2(2)(a), Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY
DOC. NO 103-2.
21
See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1105(1), Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639-40 (entered into force Jan 1, 1994) (“Each Party shall accord
to investments of another Party Treatment in accordance with international law, including
fair and equitable treatment.”). Of note, this provision was amended in 2001, when the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission, acting under NAFTA Article 1131, issued a binding
interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105(1). Id. The binding interpretation specifically
highlighted that (1) the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens is the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to foreign investors and (2) the
concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require
treatment in addition to or beyond what is required by customary international law
minimum standard treatment of aliens.
22
See PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey (U.S. v. Turk.), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5,
Award, ¶¶ 247, 248 (Jan. 19, 2007).
23
Stephen Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International
Investment Law and Practice, 1999 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 122, 127.
17
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surrounding the interpretation of FET and how the provision should be
considered in the ECT. The ECT guarantees fair and equitable treatment
(FET) to protected investments.24 However, arbitral tribunals have
repeatedly stressed that a judgment of what is fair and equitable cannot be
reached in the abstract. Instead, FET standards are dependent on the
language of their binding treaties and the specifics of the case.25
In accordance with the language of Article 10(1), tribunals considering
the ECT’s FET protection have recognized a litany of components, such
as contracting parties’ obligations to: act consistently and
transparently26; comply with due process27; and, for state actors, ensure
stable and equitable conditions.28 However, some tribunals have found
that a FET breach is only valid if the state’s acts or omissions are
‘manifestly unfair or unreasonable, such as would shock, or at least
surprise a sense of juridical propriety.’29 The latter is a much broader
interpretation of FET. Such inconsistent application amongst tribunal
interpretations of the ECTs FET standards serves to dilute the provision’s
purpose.

24

See ECT, supra note 3, at art. 10(1).
ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary (Cyprus v. Hung.), ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 44 (Oct. 2, 2006); Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Arb. No.
126/2003, Final Award (2005); Noble Ventures v. Romania (U.S. v. Rom.), ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 181 (Oct. 12, 2005); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile
(Malay. v. Chile), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 109 (May 25, 2004); Mondev Int’l
Ltd. v. United States (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 118 (Oct.
11, 2002); Waste Management v. Mexico (U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3,
Award, ¶ 99 (Apr. 30, 2004) (cited in GAMI Investments v. Mexico (U.S. v. Mex.),
UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 96 (Nov. 15, 2004)); CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic
(Neth. v. Czech), UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶336 (Sept. 13, 2001).
26
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary (Belg. v. Hung.), ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19,
Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Liability, ¶ 7.74 (Nov. 30, 2012);
(“Stressing that ‘the reference to transparency can be read to indicate an obligation to be
forthcoming with information about intended changes in policy and regulations that may
significant affect investments, so that the investor can adequately plan its investment and,
if needed, engage the host State in dialogue about protecting its legitimate expectations’”);
see also Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Société S.A. v. Republic of Albania
(Greece v. Alb.), ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, Award, ¶ 616 (Mar. 30, 2015); Plama
Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria (Cyprus v. Bulg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24,
Award, ¶ 178 (Aug. 27, 2008); Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. Republic of Tajikistan,
SCC Arb. No. V (064/2008), Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 183-84 (2008).
27
Mamidoil, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24 at ¶ 613; Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19
at ¶ 7.74.
28
Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19 at ¶ 7.74.
29
AES Corporation v. Republic of Kazakhstan (U.S. v. Kaz.), ICSID Case No. ARB/10/16,
Award, ¶ 314 (Nov. 1, 2013).
25
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a. FET under the ECT: In Theory
Article 10 of the ECT provides a complex provision on FET that also
incorporates constant protection and security, the prohibition of
unreasonable or discriminatory measures to treatment required by
international law, and to the observance of contractual obligations.
Specifically, Article 10(1) provides that:
‘[e]ach Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create stable,
equitable, favorable and transparent conditions for
Investors of other Contracting Parties to make
Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a
commitment to accord at all times to Investments of
Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable
treatment. Such Investments shall also enjoy the most
constant protection and security and no Contracting Party
shall in any way impair by unreasonable or
discriminatory
measures their
management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In no case shall
such Investments be accorded treatment less favorable
than that required by international law, including treaty
obligations. Each Contracting Party shall observe any
obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an
Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party.
treatment. 30

i.

FET in the language of the ECT

In theory, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), like most
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), commands Fair and Equitable
Treatment (FET). However, Article 10(1) of the ECT embeds the standard
of FET into a complex provision that also refers to constant protection
and security, the prohibition of unreasonable or discriminatory measures
to treatment required by international law, and to the observance of
contractual obligations. The first sentence of Article 10(1) is a general
statement regarding the favorable investment climate that contracting
parties are to maintain for investments protected by the ECT, while the
next sentence of Article 10(1) explains that such favorable conditions
‘shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of
Investors …fair and equitable treatment’. A provision that separately
provides for FET and for treatment required by international law suggests
30

ECT, supra note 2, at art. 10(1), (emphasis added).
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that the provision is not to be reasonably interpreted as meaning that FET
is the same as the treatment required by international law as it makes the
second sentence redundant. Arbitral practice has suggested FET to mean
good faith, protection of legitimate expectations, due process,
proportionality, etc.31

ii.

FET in International Law: VCLT and ICSD

There is no doctrine of precedent in international arbitration law.
While arbitral tribunals may in general seek to act consistently with each
other, in the end each tribunal must exercise its competence in accordance
with the applicable law, which will by definition be different for each BIT
and respondent State.32 The VCLT and The Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) are two key International Legal texts
tribunals use to guide and interpret the FET standard.33
The VCLT has become customary international law and provides
basic rules to guide Tribunals in the treaty interpretation. Further, the
VCLT “ha[s] also been repeatedly accepted by investment arbitration
tribunals as constituting rules of interpretation which are binding on them
in the interpretations of investment treaties, whether by virtue of being
directly binding on the parties to the BIT as treaty rules, or as customary
international law.”34
The rules for interpreting treaties, including investment treaties, are
set out in article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.39 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides:

31

See Hobér, supra note 3, at 153-90 (quoting MTD, Equity Sdn. Bhd. v Republic of Chile
(Malay. v. Chile), ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Award (May 25, 2004)). See also CMS Gas
Transmission Comp. v. Argentine Republic (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award (May 12, 2005); Waste Management, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3; Tecnicas
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States (Spain v. Mex.), ICSID Case
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States
(U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000); Azinian v.
United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/2, Award (Nov. 1,
1999).
32
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines (Switz. v.
Phil.), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Jan. 29, 2004).
33
IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (Oxford University Press, 2008).
34
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB 01/12, Award,
¶ 360 (July 14, 2006) (“The Tribunal confirmed that the BIT should be interpreted in
accordance with the VCLT”).
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A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.35
Various tribunals have agreed that the ordinary meaning of “fair” and
“equitable” is “just”, “even-handed”, “unbiased”, “legitimate”36.
However, as one tribunal has noted, these definitions do not take one very
far because they replace “fair” and “equitable” with terms of almost equal
vagueness.37
Experts also look to Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention due to its
references on “applicable law in the field of ICSID arbitral disputes”38.
Art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention provides:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with
such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the
absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules
of international law as may be applicable.41
The expression “and such rules of international law as may be applicable”
in Art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention gives Tribunals the choice to use
any interpretation supported by international law. This discretion becomes
overbroad when the treaty in question, as is the case with the ECT, fails to
provide which international law rules may be applicable.

b. FET under the ECT: In Practice
In practice, compliance with the FET provision outlined in Article
10(1) of the ECT is difficult to measure. Courts are reluctant to rule on
the basis of Article 10(1) even when the dispute is centered around a lack
of Fair and Equitable Treatment39. Even tribunals that do rule on the basis
of a lack of Fair and Equitable Treatment treat the ETC’s FET provision
in different ways. On Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Arbitral Tribunal
35

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html (accessed Jan. 26, 2020).
36
Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic (Ger. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award,
¶ 290 (Feb. 6, 2007); Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic (Neth. v. Czech),
UNICTRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 297 (Mar. 17, 2006); Azurix Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB
01/12 at ¶ 360.
37
Saluka Investments, UNICTRAL at ¶ 297..
38
TUDOR, supra note 23, at 9
39
See Nykomb, SCC Case No. 118/2001; see also Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul, SCC
Arb. No. V (064/2008) at ¶¶ 183-84. But see Petrobart Ltd., SCC Arb. No. 126/2003 at 45,
82.
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in Petrobart v. The Kyrgyz Republic suggested that FET was an
overarching principle that embraced all standards mentioned in the article
and “[did] not find it necessary to analyze the Kyrgyz Republic’s action in
relation to the various specific elements in Article 10(1) of the Treaty.”40
Instead, the tribunal noted that Article 10, “in its entirety is intended to
ensure fair and equitable treatments of investments.” Other Tribunals, as
was the case in Mohammad Ammar Al-Bhloul v. Republic of Tajikistan
(SCC Case No. V064/2008), completely ignore the purposes and
objectives of the ECT, even though the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties (VCLT) mandates that the treaties be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of their context and in
light of the treaty’s object and purpose41. In Mohammad Ammar AlBhloul, the Tribunal instead opted to rely on various non-ECT case law
and concluded that the provision on Fair and Equitable Treatment simply
meant that a host State is obliged to act "in an open matter and consistent
with commitments it has undertaken" 42. Three recent cases involving the
Kingdom of Spain, (1) Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. The
Kingdom of Spain; (2) Charanne B.V., Construction Investments S.A.R.L.
v Spain; and (3) Eisner Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar
Luxembourg S.a.r.l. v Spain43, further highlight the various treatment
tribunals give to the FET provision of the ECT and the Charter’s need to
define FET.

i.

Charanne B.V., Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v
Spain

The Tribunal in Charanne found that a change in regulatory regime
was within the powers of the host state and that there was not a sufficient
legitimate expectation created by Spain such that it would be considered
unfair to the investor, Construction Investments44. A state’s changing of
regimes can be overridden if the investor holds legitimate expectations that
were generated as a specific commitment towards the investor45. The
tribunal found that there was not a substantial commitment that incentives

40

Petrobart Ltd., SCC Arb. No. 126/2003 at 82.
Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul, SCC Arb. No. V (064/2008).
42
Id. at ¶¶ 175-79
43
Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain (Neth. v. Spain), ICSID
Case No. ARB/14/1, Award (May 16, 2018); Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Spain (Gr. Brit.
v. Spain), ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Award (May 4, 2017); Charanne B.V. v. Spain,
SCC Arb. No.: 062/2012, Award (Jan. 21, 2016) ¶
44
Charanne B.V., SCC Arb. No. 062/2012, Award (Jan. 21, 2016) at ¶ 539.
45
Id. at ¶ 489-490.
41
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to renewable energy could not be altered, therefore causing the case to fall
short of meeting the Tribunal’s FET standards.46
To come to this determination, the tribunal considered an investor’s
legitimate expectations to be ‘a relevant factor’ to the determination of
FET, derived from good faith principles under customary international
law.47 The decision in Charanne came down to two different schools of
thought. The majority in that case held that only specific commitments
can give rise to legitimate expectations while the dissent argued that, if
investors were relying on general law as the source for their legitimate
expectations, they would have to prove that they had undertaken sufficient
due diligence to understand the legal system.48
The majority reasoned that ‘a State cannot induce an investor to make
an investment generating legitimate expectations, to later ignore the
commitments that had generated such expectations’.49 Ultimately, the
tribunal found in favor of the state on the basis that the State had a right to
change the incentives on basis of sovereign right and used other standards
of FET rather than framing its analysis on Article 10(1) of the ECT.50

ii.

Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. The Kingdom
of Spain

In Masdar, the tribunal at the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) found Spain to be in breach of the fair and
equitable treatment (FET) standards under Article 10(1) of the Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT).51 Masdar, a Dutch company constituted in the
Netherlands, contended that, by a series of disputed measures introduced
between 2012 and 2014, Spain abolished its Royal Decree 661 of 2007
(“RD661/2007”) regime, which stimulated investment in the renewable
energy sector, and introduced a much less favorable regime, which applied
to those installations commissioned under the RD661/2007 regime alike.52
Under RD661/2007, renewable energy generators would benefit from a
premium set by the Spanish government above the wholesale market
price.53
Basing its argument off of Charanne, Masdar argued that the
enactment of the disputed measures led to the dismantling of the regime
under RD661/2007 and that the stability promised was the basis of which
46

Id. at ¶ 492-499.
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Masdar made is investments.54 Spain countered this argument by stating
that stabilization, offered in provisions or otherwise, cannot create
legitimate expectations for investors.55
While the tribunal in Masdar ultimately found that the investor had
undertaken the due diligence necessary to understand the legal system and
bring a claim of legitimate expectations based on general law, this finding
was only based on Article 10(1) after exhausting other schools of
thought.56 Again, citing Charanne, the tribunal found that a specific
commitment existed in the form of a resolution issued by Spain and
addressed specifically to each of the operating companies.57 The existence
of specific commitments between contracting parties and general
commitments, which both gave rise to legitimate expectations, caused the
tribunal to avoid ruling with either school of thought referenced in
Charanne.58
The tribunal in Masdar ultimately affirmed that a state is in fact at
undisputed liberty to amend its legislation and that FET could not include
economic and legal stability.59 Further, foreign investors could not
legitimately expect such stability from the terms of the contract unless the
terms were explicitly and directly extended to investors.60 However, the
tribunal in Masdar only considered the FET standards of Article 10(1) of
the ECT after noting the existence of specific and general commitments
and coming to a roadblock on how to reach its decision.61 Rather than
utilizing Article 10(1) of the ECT for its intended purpose, the tribunal in
Masdar only consulted the ETC’s provision on FET after exhausting other
options.
iii. Eisner Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg
S.a.r.l. v Spain
The tribunal in Eisner Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar
Luxembourg S.a.r.l. v Spain62 found in favor of the investor on legitimate
expectations and fair and equitable treatment standards. In the decision,
the tribunal reiterated that a state has full regulatory powers, so long as the
state’s powers do not abrogate its fair and equitable treatment obligations
54
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towards investors63. Thus, any changes made should take into account the
circumstances of existing investments made in reliance on the prior
regime.
In Eiser, the tribunal accepted that the regulatory change was so
radical and fundamental that it affected the financial fundamentals of the
investors and far surpassed the benefits envisioned at the time of the
investment.64 The ECT was found to protect investors against total and
unreasonable changes.65 While states are allowed to make changes, the
changes should not disrupt the fundamental stability and essential
characteristics of the legal regime relied upon by investors in making longterm investments in the state. The tribunal in Eisner applies Article 10(1)
directly to the fair and equitable treatment claims, noting that “[the ECT]
Article 10(1) obligation to accord investors fair and equitable treatment
provides the most appropriate legal context for assessing the complex
factual situation presented.”66 The tribunal further notes that a host state
should avoid radical amendments on key characteristics of the investment
that were relied upon by investors, as such radical changes could constitute
a breach of the FET standards.67

III. CONCLUSION
While alternative sources to interpret FET standards can be derived
from common sources of international law, such as the VCLT and the
ICSID Convention, modernizing Article 10(1) of the ECT to include
definitive language on FET under the Treaty would prove useful to
arbitration tribunals and contracting parties. A definition of what
constitutes FET under the Treaty would minimize confusion, increase
tribunals’ willingness to interpret FET under the guise of the Treaty and
yield a more consistent interpretation of FET as it relates to the ECT. Only
through proper interpretation can the ECT truly serve its purpose of
‘promot[ing] long-term co-operation in the energy field, based on
complementarities and mutual benefits, in accordance with the objectives
and principles of the Charter’68.
The three recent cases involving the Kingdom of Spain, (1) Masdar
Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. The Kingdom of Spain; (2) Charanne
B.V., Construction Investments S.A.R.L. v Spain; and (3) Eisner
63

Id. at ¶ 362.
Id. at ¶ 43-452.
65
Id. at ¶ 363
66
Id. at 441-452.
67 67
Id.
68
ECT, supra note 1, at art. 10(1)
64

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

309

Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg S.a.r.l. v Spain69,
all shared a similar thread that could be utilized to modernize the ETC and
provide a more robust definition of FET. The concepts and conflicts in
the three Spanish cases reflect recent trends in Energy Arbitrations under
the ECT and boil down to three key aspects regarding Fair and Equitable
Treatment. First, all three tribunals support the notion that in general,
states have the sovereign right to make changes to their regulatory
regime.70 Second, in their opinions, each of the three tribunals noted that
this sovereign right to make regulatory changes could breach FET
standards toward investors if there was a legitimate expectation created by
the state that the regulatory regime would not change.71 Third, the
tribunals in all three cases weighed whether there was a fundamental
change in the regime to analyze whether there was substantial disparity in
the investor’s legitimate expectations.72 However, the three tribunals
differed in what constituted a legitimate expectation. In Charanne and
Masdar, the tribunals looked at whether there was a specific commitment
towards the investor that the legislation would not be changed, as only then
could would an investor have a legitimate expectation that the regulatory
regime would not change. The opinions also touched on stability and
transparency.73 In Eisner, the tribunal focused less on specific
commitments and more on the general commitment of states to avoid
radical amendments on key characteristics of the investment that were
relied upon by investors, as radical changes were enough to constitute a
breach of FET standards.74
Providing a stable legal and business environment has been identified
in several decisions as an essential element of fair and equitable
treatment.75 Though what a State must do to meet this requirement is not
69
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fully specified under the ECT, transparency and predictability for
investors was a major part of all of the Spanish decisions and is referenced
in many Energy disputes as an integral part component of FET analyses.76
Although investors cannot reasonably expect that the circumstances at the
time the investment to be frozen in time and entirely unchanged, “fair and
equitable treatment is inseparable from stability and predictability” and
should undoubtedly be weighed in the consideration of FET under ECT.
For the foregoing reasons, the Energy Charter Treaty should modernize to
define FET as it pertains to Article 10(1) of the ECT to include stability,
transparency and legitimate expectations based on commitments in this
definition in an open-ended list of FET obligations.

Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3), Decision on
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